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effectively established the American
maritime dominance in the Persian
Gulf that exists to this day.
Among the key issues that Zatarain
raises in his gripping account of the
various battles fought between the
United States and Iran is the controversial claim by many U.S. Navy commanding officers that Iran used
Chinese-made Silkworm antiship missiles against American ships. Their
claims were discounted by senior military commanders, who refused to acknowledge that any such attacks had
occurred, despite extensive evidence to
the contrary—such attacks would have
required a military response that the
United States and the U.S. military were
neither willing nor able to undertake.
As political tensions have continued to
rise in recent years between the United
States and Iran, Tanker War is a mustread for those who have a desire or a
duty to understand how recent history
may shape perceptions of these protagonists in the future.
RON RATCLIFF

Naval War College

Graham, Bradley. By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald
Rumsfeld. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009. 803pp.
$35

In a speech given to Pentagon employees
on 10 September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the
“adversary that poses a threat, a serious
threat, to the security of the United
States” is not “decrepit dictators” but
rather “the Pentagon bureaucracy.” The
blunt message of this speech was very

soon to be bound together in a tensionfilled relationship with the ensuing wars
initiated by the terrorist attacks of the
next day. This tension gives dramatic
shape to the career of Donald Rumsfeld
as portrayed by Bradley Graham in his
well researched book By His Own Rules.
A veteran Washington Post correspondent, Graham intends that the title be regarded literally, as his detailed story
focuses on Rumsfeld as a master bureaucratic infighter who did indeed work by
his own rules. (The rules encapsulated
Rumsfeld’s views on serving and surviving in government and were eventually
printed in the Wall Street Journal.)
Rumsfeld applied the rules in his intense commitment to the type of U.S.
military President George W. Bush had
called for during his campaign, an “agile, lethal, readily deployable” armed
force. To build this force required a significant transformation of the outsized
and ponderous military developed during and immediately after the Cold
War. Graham portrays Rumsfeld as a
reformer who “had never met an organization he didn’t want to change” and
who had come well prepared to transform the Defense Department, but for
two untimely wars.
Rumsfeld’s personal goal of transforming the military seemed to overshadow
his responsibilities for prosecuting the
wars. Graham describes at length how
Rumsfeld’s missteps in managing the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused
him to become the “personification of
the arrogance and misjudgments of the
Bush Administration,” from damaging
interagency power struggles to intolerance of differing viewpoints, to a lack of
ability to acknowledge mistakes or
change strategies.
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Yet Graham also well portrays
Rumsfeld as a complex man who got
things accomplished. A tenacious collegiate wrestler at Princeton and a Navy
pilot, Rumsfeld was elected to Congress
at age thirty. He served four terms before President Richard Nixon appointed him as head of the Office of
Economic Opportunity and then as ambassador to NATO. Under President
Gerald Ford, Rumsfeld would serve as
White House chief of staff and as the
youngest-ever secretary of defense. In
Rumsfeld’s business career, he was a
CEO responsible for the successful
turnaround of several major corporations. With his appointment in 2001, he
would also become the oldest to serve
as secretary of defense. In all of his
many appointments and responsibilities, Rumsfeld comes across as an intense, capable, and ambitious operator
with a “deep moral streak.”
Graham’s well written and comprehensive narrative implies an answer to the
question of why an administrator
known for his diligent and rational approach to resolving complex issues ultimately presided over a deeply dysfunctional policy-making process. In
Rumsfeld, overconfidence eventually
converted a healthy skepticism about
thorough organizational procedures
into near contempt for them. Transforming the military, like countering an
insurgency, proved to be more about
changing minds than about building
new weapons or using old ones. Graham concludes that Rumsfeld’s “biggest
failings were personal—the result of the
man himself, not simply of the circumstances he confronted.”
WILLIAM CALHOUN

Naval War College
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Barlow, Jeffrey G. From Hot War to Cold: The U.S.
Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955.
Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009.
710pp. $65

The U.S. Navy that patrolled the
world’s oceans with such unquestioned
dominance in the 1990s did not spring
into existence full-blown, nor was its
creation a smooth evolution based on
dispassionate analysis and national consensus. The early years of that postwar
Navy, particularly its first, crucial decade, were marked by storms, impassioned debate, and bitter political
battles. This turmoil had started before
the end of the Second World War and
would continue into the mid-1950s.
Unfortunately, there has been far too
little written about this period in the
U.S. Navy’s history.
Jeffrey Barlow, a noted naval historian
and author, has done much to close
that gap and in the process has produced a stunning book. Meticulously
researched and scrupulously documented, From Hot War to Cold is a
gripping account of how the modern
Navy was formed in the crucible of the
first ten years after the war. As a history, this volume is first-rate. As a study
of decision making, it is superb.
Barlow consistently reminds the reader
just how important this decade was. As
he relates, military and government
leaders wrestled with critical emerging
technologies, tectonic political shifts,
and ferocious internal battles. He examines every aspect of these times, tracing
how military organizations were shaped
and affected by a series of defense reorganization acts, and how the Air Force
and Navy battled for a role in the nation’s nuclear strategy. Over time,
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